"For the TSLF, success means low bidding or no bidding," Alea remarks.

Alternative explanations - it's not lack of demand, it's just that prospective borrowers don't have enough quality collateral; or they're borrowing from the discount window instead.

But if you thought the Term Auction Facility was going to achieve its goal of bringing interbank lending rates down - well, it hasn't.

At the center of the financial market crisis of 2007-2008 was a highly unusual jump in
spreads between the overnight inter-bank lending rate and term London inter-bank offer
rates (Libor). Because many private loans are linked to Libor rates, the sharp increase in
these spreads raised the cost of borrowing and interfered with monetary policy. The
widening spreads became a major focus of the Federal Reserve, which took several
actions—including the introduction of a new term auction facility (TAF)—to reduce
them. This paper documents these developments and, using a no-arbitrage model of the
term structure, tests various explanations, including increased risk and greater liquidity
demands, while controlling for expectations of future interest rates. We show that
increased counterparty risk between banks contributed to the rise in spreads and find no
empirical evidence that the TAF has reduced spreads.

We aren't past the third peak in the TED spread yet - or if we are, there's a fourth one coming right up, Krugman reckons.