Very good and highly readable speech, posted at the FT.
In a short space, Persaud brings out three incisive points:
...market-sensitive risk models used by thousands of market participants work on the assumption that each user is the only person using them... In today’s flat world, market participants from Argentina to New Zealand have the same data on the risk, returns and correlation of financial instruments and use standard optimization models...
When a market participant’s risk model detects a rise in risk in his portfolio, perhaps because of some random rise in volatility, and he tries to reduce his exposure, many others are trying to do the same thing at the same time with the same assets. A vicious cycle ensues of vertical price falls prompting further selling. Liquidity vanishes down a black hole... Paradoxically, the observation of areas of safety in risk models, creates risks and the observation of risk, creates safety.
...
This brings us to the philosophical problem of the reliance of supervisors on bank risk models. The reason we regulate markets over and above normal corporate law is that from time to time markets fail and these failings have devastating consequences. If the purpose of regulation is to avoid market failures, we cannot use as the instruments of financial regulation, risk-models that rely on market prices, or any other instrument derived from market prices such as mark-to-market accounting... These tools are like seat belts that stop working whenever you press hard on the accelerator.
...the asymmetry of being a buyer of last resort without also being a seller of last resort during the unsustainable boom will only condemn us to cycles of instability.
The alternative is to try and avoid booms and crashes through regulatory and fiscal mechanisms designed to work against the incentives...


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