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   <title>Over the Counter</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/" />
   <link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://blog.risk.net/atom.xml" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7</id>
   <updated>2008-10-07T16:21:09Z</updated>
   <subtitle>Risk.net</subtitle>
   <generator uri="http://www.sixapart.com/movabletype/">Movable Type 3.36</generator>

<entry>
   <title>The funding glut</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/10/the_funding_glut.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52290</id>
   
   <published>2008-10-07T16:12:55Z</published>
   <updated>2008-10-07T16:21:09Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The Fed&apos;s finally managed to pour more money into the markets than they can soak up - yesterday&apos;s vastly increased TAF auction was undersubscribed. (Undeterred, the Fed&apos;s planning an entirely new intervention - in the commercial paper and unsecured lending...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[The Fed's finally managed to pour more money into the markets than they can soak up - yesterday's <a href="http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=818988">vastly increased TAF auction</a> was <a href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20081007d.htm">undersubscribed</a>. (Undeterred, the Fed's planning an entirely new intervention -<a href="http://www.aleablog.com/fed%E2%80%99s-new-plan-unsecured-loans/"> in the commercial paper and unsecured lending markets</a>.)
There's no sign of an easing in interbank lending costs - <a href="http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=818951">Libor rocketed up again</a> today.
And there are <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2008/10/banks_ask_chancellor_for_capit.html">reports</a> that RBS, Lloyds and Barclays - the UK's three biggest banks - are calling for a £15 billion bailout. That's £15 billion <i>each</i>.
Warren Buffett is still sanguine, <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/98782-buffett-buys-ge-goldman-should-you-follow?source=feed">buying into GE</a> despite rumours (via Felix Salmon) that it's <a href="http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/10/06/global-cardiac-arrest?tid=true">on the brink of bankruptcy</a>. 

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   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>An interesting distinction</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/10/an_interesting_distinction.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52276</id>
   
   <published>2008-10-06T15:43:34Z</published>
   <updated>2008-10-06T15:52:33Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Sunday: German chancellor Angela Merkel says &quot;we want to tell savers that their money is safe - the government guarantees that&quot;. Did she really mean it? The BBC has been investigating, and, apparently, she did not. It was just a...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[Sunday: German chancellor <a href="http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=818547">Angela Merkel says</a> "we want to tell savers that their money is safe - the government guarantees that".

Did she really mean it? The BBC has been investigating, and, apparently, she did not. It was <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7653902.stm">just a political statement</a>...<blockquote>
The government has been seeking to clarify her remarks amid concerns that Britain would have to follow suit to stop savings ebbing away from British banks.

But the BBC understands she was making a political commitment that savers would not lose money, rather than guaranteeing unlimited 100% protection.

The prime minister's spokesman said: "Our understanding of the situation is that the German government will not be bringing forward legislation for a legally-binding guarantee of bank deposits." </blockquote>

Presumably the full sentence would have been something like "we want to tell savers that their money is safe - the government guarantees that - <i>but we can't because it isn't actually true</i>."]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>A busy weekend</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/10/a_busy_weekend.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52273</id>
   
   <published>2008-10-06T14:08:25Z</published>
   <updated>2008-10-06T14:49:57Z</updated>
   
   <summary>...which saw the Fortis bank deal collapse and then recover, leaving BNP holding the reins - and creating a €10 billion toxic waste SPV... ... and saw the US bailout finally pass the House - and have apparently no impact...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[...which saw the Fortis bank deal collapse and then recover, <a href="http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=818698">leaving BNP holding the reins</a> - and creating a €10 billion toxic waste SPV...

... and saw the US bailout finally pass the House - and have apparently <a href="http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=818547">no impact at all</a>...

...<a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ecce0650-93a3-11dd-9a63-0000779fd18c.html">the Fed follows</a> the <a href="http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=818265">Bank of England</a> in opening its pockets still further, but with <a href="http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=818684">no effect on the panicked interbank market</a>...

Any good news? ...<a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a8a97dc-9391-11dd-9a63-0000779fd18c.html">Oil's well down</a>...
]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Counterparty Friday</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/10/counterparty_friday.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52263</id>
   
   <published>2008-10-03T15:35:49Z</published>
   <updated>2008-10-03T15:54:48Z</updated>
   
   <summary>We are indeed drifting into the arena of the unwell. Yves Smith picks up on the FT warning about the potential for disaster in the upcoming CDS settlement auctions. Is this why banks are hanging on to so much cash?...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[We are indeed drifting into the arena of the unwell.

<a href="http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/10/another-reason-for-cash-hoarding-big.html">Yves Smith</a> picks up on the <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6beabcdc-8f51-11dd-946c-0000779fd18c.html">FT warnin</a>g about the potential for disaster in the <a href="http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=817712">upcoming CDS settlement auctions</a>.
Is this why banks are hanging on to so much cash? It would explain the <a href="http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=818256">immense heights reached by the Ted spread</a> and the virtual absence of interbank liquidity at the long end. 

Meanwhile, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE48R3HQ20080928">Goldman Sachs insists</a> it doesn't have any real exposure to AIG. <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/98223-goldman-says-trust-us?source=feed">Suspicious Greg is suspicious</a>. But <a href="http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/10/02/is-transparency-always-a-good-idea">Salmon suspects</a> that more information from GS wouldn't help a bit and <a href="http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/10/02/goldman-sachs-and-the-regulatory-arbitrage-trade?tid=true">adds</a>: "My gut feeling is that we can trust Viniar on this one. He says that Goldman had hedged its AIG exposure, and I don't think he's the type of person to come out with a bald-faced lie." 

]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Mackereleconomics</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/10/mackereleconomics.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52259</id>
   
   <published>2008-10-03T08:21:27Z</published>
   <updated>2008-10-03T08:37:22Z</updated>
   
   <summary>I have stolen this WSJ story from Paul Krugman... Inmates of America&apos;s vast prison system are not allowed to possess cash. Traditionally this meant that cigarettes were used as a medium of exchange - but then smoking was banned. The...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[I have stolen <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122290720439096481.html">this WSJ story</a> from <a href="http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/wholly-mackerel/">Paul Krugman</a>... 

Inmates of America's vast prison system are not allowed to possess cash. Traditionally this meant that cigarettes were used as a medium of exchange - but then smoking was banned. The replacement is, for some reason, mackerel fillets.

<blockquote>Unlike more expensive delicacies, former prisoners say, the mack is a good stand-in for the greenback because each can (or pouch) costs about $1 and few -- other than weight-lifters craving protein -- want to eat it.</blockquote>

Question, though: surely the reason that cigarettes were used in the first place is that lots of people <i>did</i> want them? Why aren't the prisoners using some more desirable substitute for cigarettes? Stamps are mentioned, which seem ideal. After all, they're durable, compact, have an obvious face value, and easily convertible into cash outside the prison, unlike mackerel - the non-convertibility of the "mack" is mentioned as a problem. Why has mackerel outdone stamps - or the other alternatives such as PowerBars? The article suggests that it's because of mackerel's undesirability, but that just seems wrong. 

Maybe what we have is a QWERTY situation; there were so many good alternatives springing up after the cigarette ban that none of them were able to dominate the market. Mackerel, purely by chance - perhaps some <a href="http://www.jesusradicals.com/library/tilly/warmaking.pdf">large criminal group</a> decided to start accepting the mackerel as settlement for all debts public and private - became the leading contender, and after that network effects took over; mackerel became widely used because it was widely used, and everyone knew that other traders would accept the mackerel, despite its apparent disadvantages. A bit like the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maria_Theresa_Thaler">Maria Theresa Thaler</a>.

The next step is to watch for the emergence of notes of hand backed by large reserves of mackerel held by a reliable (in prison terms) central authority... 


]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>The Hidden Put</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/10/the_hidden_put.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52247</id>
   
   <published>2008-10-02T13:08:51Z</published>
   <updated>2008-10-02T13:29:38Z</updated>
   
   <summary>This interesting paper from Daniel Gros looks at the scope of the bailout and asks: what, if anything, are subprime MBS worth? Not a whole lot, is the answer. Because US mortgages are non-recourse, they effectively contain an embedded put...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[This <a href="http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1714">interesting paper</a> from Daniel Gros looks at the scope of the bailout and asks: what, if anything, are subprime MBS worth?

Not a whole lot, is the answer. Because US mortgages are non-recourse, they effectively contain an embedded put - at any time, the holder can sell his house to the bank for the amount of the outstanding loan. Depending on your assumptions of future house price movements, this could mean that subprime MBS are collectively worth pretty much zero.

<a href="http://www.aleablog.com/bailout-europe-edition/">Alea</a> and <a href="http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/10/france-calls-for-300-billion-european.html">Yves Smith</a> both have news of the proposed €300 billion European bailout. ]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Libor pains</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/10/libor_pains.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52241</id>
   
   <published>2008-10-01T16:51:51Z</published>
   <updated>2008-10-01T17:00:38Z</updated>
   
   <summary>We&apos;ve been running daily reports on interbank borrowing costs for some time now - here&apos;s the latest. (Get them sent straight to you via our RSS feed or sign up for the Risk News email newsletter - now running twice...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[We've been running daily reports on interbank borrowing costs for some time now - <a href="http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=817846">here's the latest</a>. (Get them sent straight to you via <a href="http://www.risk.net/public/showPage.html?page=risknews_rss">our RSS feed</a> or <a href="http://signup.incisivemedia.com/financial_risk_man/">sign up for the Risk News email newsletter</a> - now running twice a week because there's, well, just so much news.)

<a href="http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/10/01/libor-update-still-frozen?tid=true">Salmon comments</a>:

<blockquote>Overnight Libor came down today, to Extremely High from Utterly Ridiculous. But three-month Libor went up: it's now 4.15%, which means that TED's at 334bp -- or as it's referred to these days, "frozen". (No interbank lending is actually going on at these, or any, levels.)
... frankly I'm not sure that even passage of a $700 billion bailout bill will be enough to unfreeze markets at this point.</blockquote>]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Quote mining</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/10/quote_mining.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52239</id>
   
   <published>2008-10-01T13:50:53Z</published>
   <updated>2008-10-01T13:53:50Z</updated>
   
   <summary>&quot;I keep my savings in HSBC, which reflects the fact that I am a very cautious banker&quot; - Paolo Comboni, head of finance and treasury, Banca Intesa. &quot;Those responsible [for the crisis] should face, at the least, financial penalties&quot; -...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA["I keep my savings in HSBC, which reflects the fact that I am a very cautious banker" - Paolo Comboni, head of finance and treasury, Banca Intesa.

"Those responsible [for the crisis] should face, at the least, financial penalties" - Nicolas Sarkozy, president of France.

And read Felix Salmon on <a href="http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/09/30/when-regulation-works?tid=true">the kudos owed to Spain's central bank</a>.]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>No More Mr Nice Guy</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/09/no_more_mr_nice_guy.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52048</id>
   
   <published>2008-09-12T15:16:52Z</published>
   <updated>2008-09-12T15:29:23Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The FT reports that Bank of America, JC Flowers and the Chinese sovereign wealth fund CIC are preparing to buy Lehman &quot;at fire sale prices&quot;, while the Treasury stands well back. No bailout this time... (Fire sale is about right...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[The <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f3586ede-80ca-11dd-82dd-000077b07658.html">FT reports</a> that Bank of America, JC Flowers and the Chinese sovereign wealth fund CIC are preparing to buy Lehman "at fire sale prices", while the Treasury stands well back. No bailout this time... 

(Fire sale is about right - <a href="http://www.efinancialnews.com/homepage/content/2451782358">according to this</a>, Lehman's staff bonus pool is now worth more than the bank itself.)

Seems like a good opportunity to refer to <a href="http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Debt_and_PowerCSR37.pdf">this paper</a>, which is by Brad Setser (who looks like an optimist only because he used to blog next to Nouriel Roubini) and looks at the effect of being a debtor nation: <blockquote>the U.S. deficit matters for economic and strategic reasons alike. The United States may have more to lose than its creditors if they sell American assets or stop accumulating them at their current pace. This gives creditors potential leverage over U.S. policy. Setser also argues that indebtedness limits America’s ability to influence other countries’ policies, for example through sanctions and lending arrangements.</blockquote>]]>
      <![CDATA[There's also this paper, on the ultimate effects of the mortgage crisis: <blockquote>we estimate that the crisis could lower real GDP growth in 2008 and 2009 by an average of 1.8 percentage points per year. This assumes that the GSEs continue to expand their mortgage book of business aggressively, an outcome that has become more likely following the measures announced by the U.S. Treasury on September 7, 2008. If instead the GSEs stopped expanding, the estimated GDP hit would rise to 3.2 points per year.</blockquote>

]]>
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Knock-on effects</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/09/knockon_effects.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52043</id>
   
   <published>2008-09-12T14:08:33Z</published>
   <updated>2008-09-12T14:13:32Z</updated>
   
   <summary>On Monday I mentioned the prospect of problems at US banks which had been using Fannie and Freddie stock as part of their regulatory capital - here&apos;s a bit more detail: PNC Financial Services Group, for instance, warned in a...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[On Monday <a href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/09/mr_paulson_has_seized_the_mean.html">I mentioned the prospect of problems</a> at US banks which had been using Fannie and Freddie stock as part of their regulatory capital - here's <a href="http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12229793/?f=rsspage">a bit more detail</a>:<blockquote> PNC Financial Services Group, for instance, warned in a regulatory filing it expects to record a "significant other-than-temporary impairment charge"... with an aggregate cost of $80 million...

LSB Corp., the parent company of River Bank, reported that it expects to record a non-cash charge in the September quarter...

 Cascade Financial Corp. warned that it expects to record a non-cash, after-tax charge to its income statement related to its investments in Fannie and Freddie preferred issues for the September quarter. The total potential remaining loss on the company’s investment in the preferred stock is $12.1 million ...</blockquote>]]>
      <![CDATA[And <a href="http://www.aleablog.com/gse-credit-event-victim-found/">Alea has found</a> a Canadian fund that made the wrong bet on 40% fixed-recovery CDS on the GSEs.

Much more to come on this, I'm sure.]]>
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Curtain call</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/09/curtain_call.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52029</id>
   
   <published>2008-09-11T15:03:38Z</published>
   <updated>2008-09-11T15:09:28Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Lehman Crashing Again - down 45% this morning Lehman Risk Jumps as Default Swap Traders Demand Upfront Fees - Contracts protecting $10 million of Lehman debt for one year cost 13 percent upfront and 5 percent a year, according to...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[<a href="http://www.aleablog.com/lehman-crashing-again/">Lehman Crashing Again</a> - down 45% this morning

<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aXsJf36zduBM&refer=home">Lehman Risk Jumps as Default Swap Traders Demand Upfront Fees</a>  - Contracts protecting $10 million of Lehman debt for one year cost 13 percent upfront and 5 percent a year, according to CMA prices at 9:50 a.m. in New York.

<a href="http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/09/lehman-end-imminent.html">Lehman End Imminent</a> - I heard the rumour from two sources that Lehman is in its final day or two and Goldman is willing to buy the firm, and the second source, who volunteered the information, is sufficiently well plugged in that I trust the reading. This came from a former senior employee:

    <blockquote>A couple friends of mine from LEH trading desk called me this a.m. to say that mgmt has taken employees aside to let them know that the end should come in next 24-48 hours. Ratings agencies apparently told them that the steps were not sufficient to prevent a d/g, and LEH mgmt asked them to hold off for a day or so to give them a chance to resolve situation (with sale of company). Apparently GS is willing buyer, but is buyer of last resort from LEH's perspective, b/c they would keep very few LEH employees. </blockquote>

Maybe we'll have another <a href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/09/mr_paulson_has_seized_the_mean.html">Sunday afternoon announcement</a> this weekend. Or sooner.]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Sauve qui peut</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/09/sauve_qui_peut.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.52023</id>
   
   <published>2008-09-11T11:16:26Z</published>
   <updated>2008-09-11T11:40:12Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Lehman&apos;s has announced its turnaround plan - keep selling off the residential mortgages, spin off the commercial real estate, sell a chunk of the investment management division, cut dividends and hope to pull through. (Sounds familiar.) It was never likely...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[Lehman's has announced <a href="http://www.lehman.com/press/qe/docs/091008_3q08_expected.pdf">its turnaround plan</a> - keep selling off the residential mortgages, spin off the commercial real estate, sell a chunk of the investment management division, cut dividends and hope to pull through. (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PQ17">Sounds familiar</a>.)

It was never likely that the US authorities would be prepared for a second bailout in the same week, after all.

Felix Salmon <a href="http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/09/10/can-lehman-default?tid=true">said yesterday</a> that Lehman could be the first major default of the crisis. Or <a href="http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/09/10/will-lehman-or-wamu-default?tid=true">maybe WaMu.</a>

The FT points out that <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/413d5780-7f0a-11dd-a3da-000077b07658.html">the equity markets are not impressed.</a> Neither are the CDS markets; Lehman ten-years are now at <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSN1050626520080910">610 bp</a> and WaMu at 2200bp!]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Large, friendly letters</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/09/large_friendly_letters.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.51984</id>
   
   <published>2008-09-08T16:52:06Z</published>
   <updated>2008-09-08T17:12:10Z</updated>
   
   <summary>This stampede happened today... United Airlines parent UAL Corp. lost almost all its market value after an erroneous report that the company had filed for bankruptcy. Jean Medina, a spokeswoman for the Chicago-based carrier, said in a telephone interview that...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[This stampede happened today...

<blockquote>United Airlines parent UAL Corp. lost almost all its market value after an erroneous report that the company had filed for bankruptcy.

Jean Medina, a spokeswoman for the Chicago-based carrier, said in a telephone interview that the report was incorrect. UAL fell to 1 cent, down $12.29, at 11:07 a.m. New York time in Nasdaq Stock Market composite trading. Trading in UAL's shares was halted. 
</blockquote>

I would say that <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aVTYI5K9EDsQ&refer=news">this indicates</a> the markets are a little tense today. Nervous, even. One local paper in Florida (of course, it would be Florida, wouldn't it?) mistakenly reposts a six-year-old story saying that UAL has gone into Chapter 11, and suddenly the stock goes through the floor?

<a href="http://www.nyse.com/about/history/1022743347410.html">The NYSE boasts</a> that "the six massive Corinthian columns across [our] Broad Street façade impart a feeling of substance and stability and, to many, it seems the very embodiment of the nation’s growth and prosperity". Perhaps NASDAQ should consider adding to <a href="http://www.nasdaq.com/">its website</a>, in large, friendly letters, the words "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Don%27t_Panic_(Hitchhiker%27s_Guide_to_the_Galaxy)">DON'T PANIC</a>". ]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>In your copious free time</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/09/in_your_copious_free_time.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.51983</id>
   
   <published>2008-09-08T16:31:09Z</published>
   <updated>2008-09-08T16:38:53Z</updated>
   
   <summary>...admittedly it&apos;s probably a fairly busy day for most people. But that&apos;s all the more reason to be reading Risk! The September issue&apos;s just gone up on the website - take a look at Merrill&apos;s latest attempt to save itself...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[...admittedly it's probably a fairly busy day for most people. But that's <em>all the more reason</em> to be reading <em>Risk</em>! The September issue's just gone up <a href="http://www.risk.net">on the website</a> - take a look at <a href="http://www.risk.net/public/showPage.html?page=813182">Merrill's latest attempt to save itself</a> from its CDO investments, the <a href="http://www.risk.net/public/showPage.html?page=813185"><em>Risk</em> interdealer rankings</a> and plenty more.

Once you've done that, there are a couple of decent papers from the Fed: this <a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/09/Milne.pdf">historically erudite look</a> at the Northern Rock failure and this highly readable <a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/09/Mizen.pdf">analysis of the credit crisis</a>.]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Mr Paulson has seized the means of production</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/09/mr_paulson_has_seized_the_mean.html" />
   <id>tag:blog.risk.net,2008://7.51977</id>
   
   <published>2008-09-08T09:11:32Z</published>
   <updated>2008-09-08T11:08:36Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Naturally, there is far more being written today about the Fannie and Freddie bailout than anyone can assimilate, but a few points: what&apos;s going to happen to GSE shareholders? Paulson&apos;s speech includes the warning: &quot;The federal banking agencies are assessing...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Alexander Campbell</name>
      <uri>mailto:alexander.campbell@incisivemedia.com</uri>
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blog.risk.net/">
      <![CDATA[Naturally, there is far more being written today about the Fannie and Freddie bailout than anyone can assimilate, but a few points:

what's going to happen to GSE shareholders? <a href="http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm">Paulson's speech</a> includes the warning: <blockquote>"The federal banking agencies are assessing the exposures of banks and thrifts to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The agencies believe that, while many institutions hold common or preferred shares of these two GSEs, only a limited number of smaller institutions have holdings that are significant compared to their capital. The agencies encourage depository institutions to contact their primary federal regulator if they believe that losses on their holdings of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac common or preferred shares, whether realized or unrealized, are likely to reduce their regulatory capital below "well capitalized." </blockquote>

Can we get a bit more detail on that? Probably not - <a href="http://news.morningstar.com/newsnet/ViewNews.aspx?article=/DJ/200808281331DOWJONESDJONLINE000757_univ.xml">OTS is looking into it</a>, and estimated that 2% of thrifts had GSE shareholdings equivalent to 10% or more of Tier One capital. 

Normally, of course, banks wouldn't be allowed to hold unlimited amounts of equity as capital; but GSEs were regarded as special. Weren't they just.

<a href="http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/09/bye-bye-banks-freddie-and-fannie.html">Yves Smith points out</a> the damage this could do - estimating that it could cut banks' lending ability by $180 billion. (And adds her surprise that both common and preferred shareholders are being almost wiped out.)]]>
      <![CDATA[And then there are the CDS to worry about. <a href="http://www.aleablog.com/fannie-and-freddie-cds/">Alea reckons</a> that the bailout (sorry, conservatorship) probably counts as a triggering event; but these <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN2647552120080826">two</a> <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aH.H8Wh0e5B8&refer=home">articles</a> from last month disagree, pointing out that GSE debt is written to be a bit more flexible. Payments could be suspended for up to five years (FIVE YEARS?) without triggering a default. 
Here's an earlier <a href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/07/fannie_and_freddie_again.html">post about the CDS spread on GSEs</a>.

Big picture: <a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/09/07/so-true/">economist Brad Setser writes</a> "I suspect this is the first case where foreign central banks exercised their leverage as creditors to push the US government to make a policy decision that protected their interests..." 
Quite possibly. Foreign central banks have been shifting towards treasuries rather than agencies in the last few months for exactly this reason. There's also the point that a lot of of the debt is being held by US institutions, who are every bit as able to put pressure on the Treasury to save their bacon.

Bottom line: the Treasury has committed to buying lots of MBS from the GSEs; the GSEs, meanwhile, are going to keep increasing their MBS holdings until the end of next year, and then taper them down at 10% a year to an unspecified sustainable level. 
Which means taking on $300 billion losses, <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=arc1_32y8rcg&refer=home">reckons William Poole</a>, ex of the St Louis Fed. 

Personal take: there is, <a href="http://blog.risk.net/2008/08/the_end_of_the_beginning.html">once again</a>, a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Paul_Vann">John Vann</a> connection. The nonsense that was the GSE setup dates back to when the US government decided to turn a government agency into a sort-of-government-guaranteed but publicly traded private sector company. The result was a company that exploited an implicit government guarantee to make profits for its shareholders, and went outside the original intent of its founders to grow very aggressively in the US mortgage market. Why did this sort-of-not-really privatisation take place? Because it was 1968, and the Vietnam War was putting immense pressure on the federal budget - moving Fannie Mae's liabilities off balance sheet would hide them. (Hiding your embarrassing debts in an off balance sheet entity with a silly name? <a href="http://en.wikipedia.com/Enron">Sounds familiar</a>.) Creating a second GSE, Freddie Mac, two years later, was supposed to keep the market competitive; in fact, the two unsupervised GSEs seem to have operated as a duopoly. And, as a result, seven more years of war spending seemed slightly more fiscally sustainable.
In their proper historical context, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac aren't just financial embarrassments - they're the final legacy of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Best_and_the_Brightest">the best and the brightest</a>, the very last of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Bright_Shining_Lie">Bright Shining Lies</a>.
]]>
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